We show that industrial ownership structures, such as keiretsu groupings in Japan, may signi…cantly impact …rms' incentives to engage in FDI. Two channels are identi…ed by which ownership structure matters for FDI incentives. The …rst channel involves the direct incentives generated via standard product and factor market interactions. The second channel involves the indirect incentives generated by sharing of information which reduces entry costs. Using data on the Japanese FDI activity by both keiretsu and non-keiretsu …rms, we …nd evidence to support the importance of the second channel as an explanation for …rm-level FDI patterns, but not for the …rst.
Introduction.
It has frequently been suggested that …rms in the large industrial groupings of Japan and Korea, known respectively as keiretsu and chaebol, may behave di¤erently from their US or European counterparts. Members of these industrial groupings hold ownership shares in each other, obtain repeated …nancing from associated member banks, and participate on joint committees. 1 For each of these reasons it has been argued that the structure of keiretsu and chaebol lead their member …rms to behave (semi)cooperatively. Consequently, they may be expected to internalize externalities and …nd ways to mitigate the problems implied by information asymmetries. 2 It has been further noted that cross-shareholding structures can also weaken a …rm's bargaining position and dilute its market incentives, Flath [8] Flath [9] .
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationships between industrial ownership structure and the incentives for …rms to carry out foreign direct investment (FDI). It has been alleged that (semi)cooperative industrial ownership structures, such as the Japanese keiretsu system, yield their members advantages in exploiting opportunities for FDI. Typically these advantages are explained as arising from access to cheap funds for investment. While these stories seem quite plausible, the empirical support for them has been somewhat mixed (see Belderbos and Sleuwaegen [3] , Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [15] , Fukao, Izawa, Kunimori and Nakakita [11], and McKenzie [21] ). In this paper we take a di¤erent approach. Rather than concentrate on the implications of ownership structure for the …nancing of FDI, we instead focus, …rst, on the implications it has for the strategic incentives to invest that arise through the interactions between …rms on input and output markets, and, second, on the incentives it provides for information generation and dissemination.
Our paper contains both theoretical and empirical sections. We …rst develop an illustrative theoretical model similar to that proposed in the literature on the adoption of new technology 1 Bank representatives also sit on the boards of associated …rms. 2 See for example Suzuki [25] , Dewenter and Warther[5] , Kimura and Pugel [16] .
by Fudenberg and Tirole [10] . FDI decisions are modelled as entry probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium to a game in stages. We model the factor and product market interactions by allowing the …rms' payo¤s to change as successive entry takes place. The information aspect of the process is captured by assuming that entry costs are a declining function of the total number of prior investments. To further capture the salient features of the FDI process we assume some information is public, and is generated as an externality to be enjoyed by all potential entrants, whereas some of the information is private, and is only transmitted between …rms engaged in cooperative relationships.
Modelling FDI decisions as entry probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium has previously been proposed by Linn and Saggi [19] and Ellis and Fausten [6] . Our analysis, though still not fully general, considerably extends these earlier contributions. Linn and Saggi examined a single stage game between two competitive …rms so as to obtain the comparative statics properties of the initial entry probability decision, and the optimal delay between initial and subsequent entry.
Ellis and Fausten followed the same path as Linn and Saggi but introduced overlapping share ownership into the model to analyze the implications for FDI of di¤erent ownership structures.
Our work makes two key further extensions, we introduce a third …rm into the analysis and allow for asymmetric information between …rms. Introducing a third …rm might seem minor, yet it is signi…cant in three ways; (1) It allows us to consider strategic interactions between a pair of (semi)cooperative …rms and a competitive rival; (2) It allows the FDI entry game to be split into a sequence of stages, each of which is characterized by equilibrium entry probabilities, allowing examination of the relationships between entry probabilities over time; and, (3) It allows private information to play a signi…cant role, as an early entrant must consider the subsequent asymmeties in information that may be gernerated by its entry.
Our extension to a three …rm game in stages also allows us to bring the evidence from the available data to bare on the theory. As with previous studies, we use a …rm-level database of Japanese FDI activity and match …rms with their keiretsu groupings. However, as suggested by theory, we pursue a much di¤erent empirical speci…cation than that explored by previous studies that have only examined whether keiretsu inclination per se increases FDI probabilities. Our theory suggests that keiretsu a¢liation e¤ects on FDI entry decisions work through the interconnectedness of …rms' FDI decisions, rather than as an independent e¤ect. Therefore, we examine whether initial entry by keiretsu …rms in a destination country have di¤erent impacts on subsequent entry probabilities by …rms of the same keiretsu versus those of non-keiretsu …rms. Consistent with the hypothesis that private information sharing amongst keiretsu …rms substantially reduces entry costs, we …nd that previous investment by keiretsu …rms leads to signi…cantly higher entry probabilities by other keiretsu-member …rms. However, we …nd little evidence that cross-ownership shares a¤ect FDI entry probabilities. Our speci…cation outperforms a model of FDI probability that only includes keiretsu a¢liation as an independent factor.
2 The Theoretical Model.
When …rms contemplate locating production facilities outside of their home countries they face a di¢cult trade-o¤. If they invest early they may gain advantages on both product and input markets. However, in moving early they also face a host of potential problems, for example it takes time to learn how to operate e¢ciently in a foreign labor market and under a foreign legal system. Thus the initial …xed costs of investment may be high. If, on the other hand, they delay entry, they will forgo some of the product and factor market advantages enjoyed by early entrants, but may gain valuable information from observing their predecessors. This information will reduce the …xed costs of initial entry. The theoretical model we now develop captures this basic tension.
Basic Structure.
We assume that there are three …rms that may produce output either in their domestic economy(ies) or abroad via FDI. The three …rms may be either fully independent, as in the case of most US …rms or, alternatively, they may be partially cooperative, as for example when linked via overlapping shareholdings, such as in the cases of Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol members.
We assume that initially all three …rms are engaged in domestic production, and that at each subsequent point in time each must choose either to continue in this production mode, m = D; or make an irreversible switch to foreign production, m = F . At any time t the ‡ow pro…t enjoyed by …rm n from choosing a production mode given the modes of production chosen by the other two …rms is written
n = 1; 2; 3; i = 1; 2; 3; j = 1; 2; 3; n 6 = i 6 = j:
Often we shall adopt shorthand notation of the form
To capture the idea that there are advantages to early investment we assume that pro…ts will vary across the di¤erent combinations of domestic production and FDI in the following manner
Thus in the absence of any relocation costs each …rm would independently prefer to undertake FDI. These inequalities may be generated in several ways. They may re ‡ect either Cournot or Bertrand competition in the product market (see Lin and Saggi [19] ), where early entrants face lower marginal costs and hence a market advantage, or, alternatively, they may purely re ‡ect labor costs where FDI allows the …rms to exploit cheap labor in the host country, but where repeated entry raises labor demand and hence wages in the appropriate labor pool 4 .
To characterize the di¤erent potential forms of industrial ownership structure we introduce the parameter¯i n which represents the claim of …rm i on the pro…ts of …rm n:
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So if we denote the total ‡ow pro…ts of …rm n as P n we may write the possibilities as 3 In this notation we shall always adopt the convention that …rms will be listed in the sequence 1,2,3,1,2 etc i.e.in ascending order except that 1 will follow 3. 4 For example Feenstra and Hanson [7] …nd that for regions of Mexico in which FDI is concentrated more than 50% of the increase in the total wages of skilled workers can be attributed to the e¤ects of foreign capital in ‡ows. 5 In the Japanese keiretsu system there are other mechanisms by which cooperation may be induced between members. Then role of associated commercial banks in providing repeated funding to members, and the placement of bank o¢cials in senior positions in the members hierarchies seem particulaly important.¯may therefore be interpreted more widely as a measure of cooperation rather than simply cross shareholdings.
;m j ;m n n = 1; 2; 3; i = 1; 2; 3; j = 1; 2; 3; n 6 = i 6 = j What distinguishes our model from its antecedents is the ability to analyze strategic FDI when there are both cooperative and non-cooperative …rms in the population. We therefore concentrate on this case and assume that …rms 1 and 2 are members of a symmetric keiretsu, so¯1 2 =¯2 1 > 0; while …rm 3 is purely competitive, so¯1 3 =¯3 1 =¯3 2 =¯2 3 = 0: We may now utilize this structure to examine the …rms' FDI decisions in an economy where some …rms are linked through industrial groupings and other are not.
The Firms' Problem.
At some initial date t = 0 each …rm is engaged exclusively in domestic production. 6 The problem each must solve is if and when to switch to FDI given that switching production from one country to another is clearly costly 7 . We assume that the cost a …rm incurs in switching from domestic to foreign production is a decreasing function of the number of …rms that have already switched. The idea here is that there is cost reducing information that may be obtained by learning from the entry experiences of preceding …rms. However, we also assume that while some of this information is publicly available, some is private and will be transferred only between …rms in the same industrial grouping. 8 We de…ne the entry date of the …rst …rm as t = t ¤ , the second as t = t ¤¤ , and the
We thus express the entry costs as 9 6 We might think of this as the time at which FDI became a potentially lower cost mode of production. Either because of the relaxation of legal restriction by the host country, an improvement in the host countries labour force, or an increase (real or threatened) in tarrifs for that countries home market etc. 7 Here we are making the implicit assumption that cross shareholding between …rms does not eliminate the direct incentive for …rms to undertake FDI as initially expressed in (1). In the simulations that follow we check that this assumption is valid. 8 We assume that the information allows for the reduction in …xed entry costs. This allows us to model the equilibria in each (sub)game as stationary. 9 Clearly similar …rms may learn more from each other than dissimilar …rms will. However, there are common problems such as learning to deal with a foreign legal system and foreign labour markets and practices that are common to all. We thus abstract from di¤erential learning in this paper. 
The …rms maximize expected pro…ts net of switching costs, which involves each selecting probabilities of FDI at each point in time given those selected by the other …rms. We write the probability of …rm n switching to FDI as ½ n :Since this is a game in stages we also require notation for which …rm(s) have already carried out FDI and which have not, consequently G n;i;j , will indicate the game where no entry has yet occurred, G n;i the (sub) game where …rms n and i have not yet entered, and G n will be the (sub)game where only …rm n has not entered. With this notation probabilities will be written in the form ½ n (G n;i ) and so on 10 The value that a …rm obtains from a particular action (F or D) in the game and each sub-game, given the actions of the other …rms, will be de…ned in the form
This is the value to …rm 1 of the action D if both other …rms also choose D in the game G 1;2;3 : In a similar vein V 3 (F F D j G 2;3 ) would represent the value to …rm 3 of the action F in the subgame G 2;3 , and so on: 12 1 0 Since each (sub)game is a stationary we do not need any further notation to denote time.
1 1 Details in the appendix.
1 2 Hereafter we shall maintain the assumptions
which are required to ensure that the whole structure does not unravel backwards with all …rms entering instantaneously at the …rst opportunity.
The Extensive Form of the Game.
We are now ready to describe how the process of FDI evolves by presenting the game in extensive form. Figure 1 illustrates the initial situation faced by the three …rms. 
Figure 1: The three …rm entry game G 1;2;3 in extensive form.
Each …rm must choose an entry probability, ½ n (G 1;2;3 ); as a best reply to those chosen by the other two …rms. Once a …rm (or …rms) has entered we move to the appropriate subgame. For example, if …rm 1 enters then …rms 2 and 3 play the subgame G 2;3 illustrated in …gure 2 Here the remaining two …rms must choose as best replies the entry probabilities ½ 2 (G 2;3 ), and ½ 3 (G 2;3 ).
Equilibrium.
To obtain the equilibrium of the model we solve recursively for equilibria in each of the potential subgames, starting with fG 1 ; G 2 ; G 3 g then using these values to solve fG 1;2 ; G 1;3 ; G 2;3 g ; and …nally using the values from both fG 1 ; G 2 ; G 3 g and fG 1;2 ; G 1;3 ; G 2;3 g to solve for G 1;2;3 : We thus obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium as a sequence of mixed strategy equilibria in the subgames. Given that …rms 1 and 2 are, by assumption, members of a symmetric keiretsu, and we have assumed symmetry between these two …rms in all other respects, it seems natural to consider symmetric equilibria where ½ 1 (G 1;2;3 ) = ½ 2 (G 1;2;3 )´½ 12 (G 1;2;3 ).
While the model is solved in the standard recursive manner we shall present our results, somewhat unconventionally, in their chronological order. This, we feel, aids the intuitive understanding of the problem and allows a better integration of the theory and evidence. Entry in the …rst wave, as inspection of …gures 1 and 2 might suggest, is very complex, if no …rm has entered at a time t then there are 8 possible strategy choices leading to 8 possible subgames.
The mixed strategy equilibrium for G 1;2;3 is characterized by 6 conditions. For each …rm n we may de…ne a value for the game and an indi¤erence condition that states the …rm is indi¤erent between FDI and domestic production. For …rms 1 or 2 these conditions take the form
similar conditions hold for …rm 3. Substituting in and solving these equations (together with the …rm 3 conditions-see appendix 3) yields solutions
Details of the form of these expressions are provided in appendix 3. The solutions are very complex and do not easily yield analytical results, thus we resort to numerical method to explore their properties.
Variations in the Level of Cooperation and Initial Cost of Entry. Tables 1 and 2 . The intuition behind these results is complex. Changes in¯e¤ect the entry probabilities both in the …rst wave entry game, and the subsequent second wave entry subgames. Recall that in a mixed strategy equilibrium the entry probabilities are determined by the requirement that each …rm be indi¤erent between undertaking FDI and continuing with domestic production. Whenī ncreases the keiretsu …rms individually …nd FDI less attractive in each subgame. This is because an entrant shares a greater proportion of the bene…ts from entry with its keiretsu partner, and 1 3 For the simulation we assumed that ¼ F DD = 100;
For variations in the …xed cost of initial entry we maintained the di¤erntial betwen initial and subseqent entry costs by imposing the same changes on C ¤¤ and C ¤¤ . The properties of the results reported were generally not sensitive to variations parameter values that satis…ed the restrictions of the theory. 1 4 It might appear that the …rst column in table 1 for¯= 0 reveals an inconsistency in the results. This is not the case. The simulations were carried out assuming that keiretsu …rms share all private information (notp ercent of it) thus the entry probabilites should only be equal when¯= 0 and C ¤¤ ¡ C ¤¤ . Inspection of table 2 demonstrates that this consistency check is satis…ed. also shares a greater proportion of the losses its entry imposes on its partner. So to maintain the keiretsu …rms indi¤erence condition the probability of initial entry by the non-keiretsu …rm must decline. Similarly for the keiretsu …rms the probability of initial entry must increase to keep the non-keiretsu …rm indi¤erent between FDI and domestic production. Here the agrument is even more complex. An increase in¯makes the non-keiretsu …rm less likely to enter in each subsequent subgame (see the next section for details), the relative value of entry to the non-keiretsu …rm in the initial game thus increases. Hence, to maintain indi¤erence for the non-keiretsu …rm the probability of entry by the keiretsu …rms must increase.
Increases in intitial entry costs lower the probabilities of entry for both keiretu and nonkeiretsu …rms 15 . Here, in equilibrium, both the keiretsu …rms and the non-keiretsu …rm must have lower entry probabilites if they are to remain indi¤erent between FDI and continued domestic production.
Variations in the Level of Cooperation and the Value of Private Information. Table   2 and non-keiretsu …rms (bottom cell entry), ½ 3 ; to variations in the level of cooperation between keiretsu …rms and the value of private information.
Despite their apparent complexity the properties of the equilibria may be quite easily stated.
Increases in the value of private information C ¤¤ ¡ C ¤¤ , generated by varying C ¤¤ for a given C ¤¤ ;
lower the probability of entry by non-keiretsu …rms at all levels of the cooperation parameter, and do not e¤ect the probability of entry by the keiretsu …rms. Here again the intuition is subtle and follows from understanding the nature of a mixed strategy equilibrium. An increase in C ¤¤ ¡ C ¤¤ makes it more attractive for each keiretsu …rm to delay initial entry in anticipation that the other will enter and provide them with this reduction in entry cost. Thus, for the keiretsu …rms to remain indi¤erent between FDI and domestic production the probability of entry by the non-keiretsu …rm must fall. The invariance of the keiretsu …rm's entry probabilities arrises because variations in C ¤¤ do not e¤ect the payo¤s associated with FDI for the non-keiretsu …rm, and since the probabilities of entry by the keiretsu …rms are determined by the condition that the non-keiretsu …rm is indi¤erent between FDI and domestic production it then follows that the probability of entry by the keiretsu …rms is una¤ected by variations in C ¤¤ : 16 : Notice also that for all values of¯> 0 and C ¤¤ ¡ C ¤¤ the probability of entry by each keiretsu …rm is larger than for the non-keiretsu …rm. Our results are illustrated in …gure 3 Entry cost with private information 0.09-0.13 in 0.002 increments.
Keiretsu firm. 2.4.2 The Second Wave: Entry in the Subgames G 1;2 , G 2;3 , and G 1;3 :
We term the subgames G 1;2 , G 2;3 , and G 1;3 as the second wave of entry. Here one …rm has entered and the remaining two …rms enjoy the information generated by the …rst entrant. In the games G 2;3 , and G 1;3 prior entry was by a keiretsu member, the remaining keiretsu …rm enjoys the entry cost reduction C ¤ ¡ C ¤¤ which re ‡ects both the public and private information, where as the cost reduction for the non-keiretsu …rm is only C ¤ ¡ C ¤¤ re ‡ecting only the publicly available information. In the game G 1;2 the non-keiretsu …rm has entered and only reveals the public information, giving the cost reduction C ¤ ¡ C ¤¤ : As before the equilibria in these subgames are derived from a value for the subgame and an indi¤erence condition for each of the two …rms.
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For example, in the subgame G 2;3 (and by symmetry G 1;3 ) these involve four expressions
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. The two indi¤erence conditions
and the two value functions
Details in appendix 2.
1 8 In each of these subgames, for there to be a mixed strategy equilibria we require that for each …rm neither F nor D is a dominant strategy. Consistent with our prior assumptions we assume that each …rm prefers to enter if the other does not, but both prefer not to enter if the other does. Again using the subgame G 2;3 to …x notation this translates into conditions of the form Firm It is now straightforward to derive the comparative statics properties of these subgames;
Entry Probabilities
Subgame We see that in the interesting subgames G 1;3 and G 2;3 (the ones that will be the focus of our empirical analysis), those where a mix of keiretsu and non-keiretsu …rms remain, an increase in the keiretsu cooperation parameter d¯> 0 lowers the probability of entry by non-keiretsu …rms, but does not e¤ect the keiretsu …rms, thus making the relative probability of entry by keiretsu members higher. This follows immediately from the nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probabilities ½ 3 (G 1;3 ) and ½ 3 (G 2;3 ) must satisfy the indi¤erence conditions for the keiretsu …rms. As the parameter¯increases the entering keiretsu …rm shares more of the gain from entry with the keiretsu …rm that had previously entered, and also shares more of the losses its entry imposes on this …rm. Thus the returns to entry for the new entrant are reduced, to maintain indi¤erence it is necessary then that the non-keiretsu …rm's probability of entry declines. For the interesting subgames, the e¤ects of changes in the cost parameters dC ¤¤ and dC ¤¤ may be explained in a similar manner. As C ¤¤ increases the value of entry to the non-keiretsu …rm declines, so to maintain the indi¤erence condition the entry probability of the appropriate keiretsu …rm must fall. As C ¤¤ increases the value of entry to the appropriate keiretsu …rm declines, so to maintain the indi¤erence condition of the mixed strategy equilibrium the entry probability of the non-keiretsu …rm must fall. Notice also that since d½ 3 (G 1;3 )=d¯< 0 and d½ 3 (G 2;3 )=d¯< 0 and both ½ 1 (G 1;3 ) = ½ 3 (G 1;3 ) and ½ 2 (G 2;3 ) = ½ 3 (G 2;3 ) if¯= 0 each keiretsu …rm always has a higher probability of FDI than the non-keiretsu …rm. In the subgame G 1;2 only keiretsu …rms remain and only non-keiretsu …rms have entered. The e¤ects of¯on entry probabilities are explained by the dilution of entry incentives as discussed for the other subgames. The e¤ects of C ¤¤ are again determined be the mixed strategy indi¤erence conditions as above. That C ¤¤ does not e¤ect keiretsu entry probabilities follows from the fact that the only prior entrant was not a keiretsu member and does not share any private cost reducing information.
3 Empirical Analysis.
The previous section presents a game-theoretic model that yields predictions about …rm-level FDI probabilities that depend on whether a …rm belongs to a keiretsu group or not, the strength of private information sharing within these keiretsu groups, and the degree of cooperation through overlapping ownership shares. Exact tests of the model's predictions are impossible given data availability and the (un)observability of the model's exogenous parameters, such as the degree of information sharing amongst …rms. In addition, the model is a simple representation of a more complicated reality that features thousands of Japanese …rms and dozens of di¤erent keiretsu a¢liations. Nevertheless, we think it is important to examine whether data on FDI decisions by Japanese …rms are supportive of the model and its predictions. The data we can observe and collect is FDI entry patterns by Japanese …rms, their keiretsu a¢liations, and some measures of the strength of those keiretsu a¢liations. Thus, in this section we estimate …rm-level probabilities of FDI by Japanese manufacturing …rms to examine whether keiretsu a¢liations a¤ects these probabilities in ways that are broadly consistent with the model's predictions.
Empirical Methodology.
The basic framework we use is a probit regression that estimates the probability of FDI by Japanese …rm (i) in country (j) in a particular period. Firm (i) invests in country (j) if it is a pro…table decision, which depends on a number of exogenous factors. We do not observe the pro…tability of the FDI decision (P ¤ ij ), but do observe whether the …rm engages in FDI or not (F DI ij ), as well as relevant exogenous factors (X ij ). Thus, we formulate a standard probit regression framework:
where u ij is an assumed standard normal error term and¯is a vector of parameters that we estimate.
Previous work on the relationship between keiretsu a¢liations and FDI decisions has used
a similar probit framework to analyze samples comprised of Japanese …rms with and without keiretsu a¢liations. The approach is to examine whether there is a positive correlation between a dummy variable, indicating whether a …rm is a member of a keiretsu or not, and the …rm's FDI decision. In other words, the regressor matrix, X ij = [KEIR i ; Z ij ], where KEIR i represents the "keiretsu or not" dummy variable, and Zij represents other …rm-and country-level exogenous factors that a¤ect the pro…tability of the FDI decision. Thus, the question examined by these studies is whether there is something inherent about membership in any keiretsu that makes FDI more likely for a particular …rm, ceteris paribus. Typically, the underlying hypothesis is that the source of this positive keiretsu e¤ect could be due to a variety of sources, including lower capital costs and information sharing. However, as noted in the paper's introduction, the previous studies have generally found mixed evidence of a positive statistically-signi…cant keiretsu e¤ect.
The theoretical model presented in the previous section has shown that the role of keiretsu a¢liations on FDI decisions is likely much more complicated than the model underlying the hypothesis tested by previous work. In other words, previous empirical work has been mis-speci…ed, which may be the main reason for the inconclusive results. The main insight from our theory is that the keiretsu e¤ect on FDI decisions is not necessarily an independent one as modeled by previous work. Instead, the keiretsu e¤ect on one …rm's FDI decision depends on FDI decisions (actual or potential) made by other …rms in its own keiretsu and by …rms that are not in its own keiretsu. This can be particularly seen in the subgames G 1;3 , G 1;2 and G 2;3 of our theoretical model, which we describe as the second wave of entry, and where the e¤ect of keiretsu membership on a …rm's FDI decision works through …rms' investment decisions in the previous period. For this reason, we focus on examining second-period predictions.
In order to identify the information and cooperation e¤ects of keiretsu a¢liations on FDI in subsequent (or "second wave") period, we examine interactions between the "keiretsu or not" dummy variable and previous investment by other …rms. In fact, the most interesting second-period predictions we obtain in our theoretical model are the e¤ects on a remaining keiretsu …rm and non-keiretsu …rm when a keiretsu …rm entered in the …rst period, the subgames G 1;3 and G 2;3 .
This implies the following regressor matrix to test the e¤ects of keiretsu a¢liations on subsequent FDI decisions:
where NONKEIR i = (1 ¡ KEIR i ), P F DI_K j is previous investment by all relevant keiretsua¢liated Japanese …rms in country j, and P F DI_K ij is previous FDI by …rm i's keiretsu-member …rms in countr j. The …rst term captures the e¤ect of previous investment of keiretsu members in a country on a keiretsu …rm's FDI decision into the same country. The second term captures the e¤ect of previous investment by keiretsu …rms in a country on a non-keiretsu …rm's decision to invest in the same country. As indicated by the theory, if keiretsu a¢liation leads to substantial entry cost savings from information sharing, we expect a positive coe¢cient on the …rst term indicating an increase in a keiretsu …rm's second-period entry probability when there has been previous entry by member …rms of its keiretsu. It should have no impact on the non-keiretsu …rm's entry probability. On the other hand, the cooperation e¤ect of keiretsu membership will tend to decrease the probability of subsequent entry by the non-keiretsu …rm, while having no impact on the keiretsu-…rm's entry probability.
Again, the keiretsu e¤ects we wish to uncover with this empirical speci…cation are those that jointly depend on previous investment by keiretsu …rms, not independent e¤ects of keiretsu membership on FDI entry decisions, such as those due to advantageous costs of capital. However, in the estimates below we also include a "keiretsu or not" dummy variable separately as a control regressor to examine whether these independent e¤ects are also an important factor in …rms' FDI decisions. In addition, following previous literature, we include …rm size and previous investment by the …rm in the country as controls. Firm size (assets measured in millions of yen) is expected to have a positive coe¢cient as it proxies for the level of …rm-speci…c assets held by the …rm which, by the internalization hypothesis leads to greater FDI.
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Previous FDI by the …rm is another source of information and learning by the …rm that should increase the likelihood of FDI.
Data.
We use information from Japanese Overseas Investment, 1992/93 (English version) published by Toyo Keizai Inc., for data on Japanese FDI. with what we observe in the data. In the theory we present there is a well-de…ned initial period in which all …rms are deciding whether to engage in FDI for the …rst time, and a single, well-de…ned subsequent period. In reality, it is di¢cult to identify periods of initial entry and subsequent entry.
Initial FDI by Japanese manufacturing …rms into foreign countries began sporadically in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, it seems plausible to treat any period since then as representing behavior of …rms in a period subsequent to initial entry. However, there have also been substantial ebbs and ‡ows of outward Japanese FDI activity. This suggests it is reasonable to think of the beginning of a new wave of outward FDI activity in the mid-1980s as an "initial" entry period, with investment in later years of the wave as "subsequent" entry.
As a result, we examine 1990/91 FDI-entry probabilities of Japanese …rms across nine major 1 9 We tried other more direct proxies of …rm-speci…c assets, R&D expenditures and R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by …rm size), as control regressors. However, these variables are highly correlated with …rm size, are always statistically insigni…cant, and lead to a signi…cant number of lost observations due to missing data. Their inclusion does not impact our main results in any way. Similar to previous studies, we sample …rms from the industrial and electrical machinery industries, because there is adequate frequency of FDI activity across …rms in these industries and the variability of keiretsu a¢liations is relatively high for these industries as well. We then matched these …rms to keiretsu groupings using Industrial Groupings in Japan 1988/89 published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants.
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In addition to listing …rms' keiretsu a¢liations, this publication also assigns an index of the …rm's "inclination" to its keiretsu which takes values of 1,2,3, or 4. Data on …rm size (i.e., total assets) are taken from the 1990 edition of the Japan Company Handbook published by Toyo Keizai Inc.
Results.
Column 1 of table 3 presents estimates from a base scenario where we specify the probability of entry by a Japanese …rm as a function of only its size in assets, previous FDI by the same …rm in the same country, and the …rm's strength of keiretsu inclination. The probit regression pools observations of FDI activity across all …rms and major destination countries in our sample.
This speci…cation is closest to that found in previous literature and will serve as a basis for comparison with our other estimates. We obtain positive coe¢cients on all three regressors, as expected. Interestingly, the keiretsu inclination variable is statistically signi…cant, which is not always true with previous empirical …ndings. This suggests that keiretsu a¢liation has an independent impact on FDI probabilities, which may due to a variety of explanations, such as 2 1 The top nine destination countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany.
2 2 There are eight major industrial groupings listed by the Dodwell Marketing Consultants: DKB, Fuyo, IBJ, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Sumitomo, and Tokai. In addition, a signi…cant number of our sample's …rms (12%) belonged to smaller groupings centered around a major electronics or automotive company: Hitachi, Toshiba-IHI, Toyota, and Nissan. In our sample, 45% of the …rms belonged to one of these keiretsu groupings, while the others were considered non-a¢liated. lower costs of capital discussed earlier. The …rm's size is also highly signi…cant, as will be the case with all our regressions.
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) Column 2 of table 5 shows probit estimates when we include the variables of interest suggested by this paper's theoretical analysis: interactions of previous investment by keiretsu …rms interacted with dummies indicating whether …rm is in the same keiretsu or not. The coe¢cient estimates on these focus regressors reveal an interesting pattern that sheds light on the channels through which keiretsu a¢liations a¤ect FDI decisions. In particular, the e¤ect of previous FDI in a country by keiretsu-member …rms has a strong positive e¤ect on a keiretsu …rm's probability of FDI to the same country. This provides evidence that keiretsu …rms obtain entry cost advantages from information sharing that occurs between them and the …rms in their own keiretsu that have already invested in a country. Calculation of the marginal e¤ects on entry probabilities at the means of our regressors also shows that this statistically signi…cant e¤ect has economic signi…cance as well.
In fact, a standard deviation increase in previous FDI by the …rm's own keiretsu members in a country (334 additional employees) leads to a 0.6% increase in a keiretsu …rm's subsequent FDI probability at the means. With an average subsequent FDI probability of 2.9% in our sample, this means there is a 22% increase in the keiretsu …rm's likelihood of FDI.
On the other hand, there is little evidence that cooperation (or pro…t-sharing) motives a¤ect FDI probabilities. The theory suggests that this cooperation channel would lead to a negative e¤ect of previous keiretsu FDI on non-keiretsu …rms' entry probability, while our coe¢cient estimate is positive and statistically insigni…cant. While the independent e¤ect of keiretsu a¢liation was signi…cantly positive in our column 1 regressors, its coe¢cient falls and is no longer statistically signi…cant at standard con…dence levels. In addition, our model which includes the keiretsu interaction terms clearly outperforms the modle in column 1 that only includes keiretsu a¢liation as an independent factor in FDI probabilities. Finally, size of the …rm continues to have a strong and statistically signi…cant positive correlation with FDI likelihood.
One concern with the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of table 5 may be the inclusion of keiretsu a¢liations which are centered around a major electronics or automotive …rm, rather than a major bank. These keiretsus often have vertical integration features to them, as many of the keiretsu …rms are input suppliers to the main …rm. It's possible that our strong positive correlation between previous keiretsu investment and a keiretsu …rm's subsequent FDI probability is biased upward due to economic incentives for suppliers to follow the downstream …rm rather than the e¤ects of information sharing on entry decisions. As indicated in footnote 21, 12% of our sample's …rms are in these vertical keiretsus. To gauge the sensitivity of our estimates to this issue, column 3 of table 5 reports coe¢cient estimates when we eliminate observations of …rms in vertical keiretsus from our sample. This change in our sample has no signi…cant impact on our coe¢cient estimates, and, in particular, the coe¢cient on the e¤ect of previous keiretsu FDI on a keiretsu …rm's subsequent FDI probability goes up slightly and remains statistically signi…cant.
A second issue is whether the impact of previous FDI on …rms' subsequent FDI probabilities depends on the destination country. For example, motives for investment by Japanese …rms into less-developed countries may be more concerned with outsourcing, whereas motives for invest-ment into other industrialized countries, such as the United States, may be more concerned with market access. There may also be more uncertainty and/or risk associated with investment in less-developed countries. Columns 4 and 5 of table 5, present coe¢cient estimates of our regression model for separate samples of FDI into industrialized countries (the United States, United
Kingdom, and West Germany) and less-developed countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand). The general results hold for both samples though there are some di¤erences. For both samples, previous keiretsu FDI leads to higher subsequent FDI probability for a keiretsu …rm, though the coe¢cient is almost twice as large in the lessdeveloped country sample. This may suggest that information-sharing is much more important for lowering subsequent entry costs of keiretsu members in less-developed countries. The e¤ect of previous keiretsu FDI on subsequent non-keiretsu FDI probability is positive in the less-developed country sample, though the estimated magnitude fairly small. The only other signi…cant di¤er-ence between the two samples is that the independent impact of keiretsu a¢liation is signi…cant for FDI into less-developed countries, but not for FDI into industrialized countries. If this regressor is capturing cost of capital advantages of keiretsus, a possible explanation is the home country (Japanese) sources of …nancing may be much more important for FDI into less-developed countries.
There were other sensitivity tests we conducted that had no qualitative impact on our coe¢cient estimates. First, we also used counts of FDI occurrences to construct our measures of previous FDI, but obtained similar coe¢cient signs to those reported in table 3 using employment measures. We also estimated coe¢cients using a Poisson model, rather than probit, and obtained qualitatively identical results. Finally, we speci…ed our dependent variable in employees and used a tobit speci…cation with truncation at zero, and obtained qualitatively identical results.
In summary, our estimates suggest that information-sharing advantages that occur in keiretsus once member …rms have invested in a country has a substantial impact on subsequent FDI probabilities by other keiretsu-member …rms. There is little evidence that cooperation structures (e.g., from cross-ownership and pro…t-sharing arrangements) impact FDI probabilities in substantial ways. One explanation is that cross-ownership between the keiretsu …rms and the main keiretsu bank tend to be much larger than that among the keiretsu manufacturing …rms themselves. Finally, the evidence for independent e¤ects of keiretsu a¢liations becomes weak once we control for keiretsu e¤ects through previous FDI decisions within the keiretsu, except in the case of Japanese FDI investment into less-developed countries.
4 Conclusions.
We have developed and empirically investigated a model of strategic FDI. Our focus has been on the role of industrial ownership structure in determining FDI probabilities. Our theoretical model suggests two main mechanisms by which ownership structures matter for FDI entry probabilites. This does not say that overlapping ownership structures do not matter, but rather tells us that their main e¤ect is through the incentives to generate and share information relevent to the costs of undertaking FDI.
5 Appendices.
5.1 Appendix 1 -Derivation of the value functions for the sub-games G 1 ; G 2 ;and G 3 .
We derive the value functions
and
integrating the RHS of this expression gives us
Appendix 2 -Derivation of the Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Entry
Probabilities for the Subgames G 1;2 , G 2;3 , and G 1;3 :
5.2.1 Subgame G 1;2 :
For this subgame we utilize the expressions for the value of the (sub)game and the indi¤erence conditions to solve for the entry probabilities as
Multiplying through the indi¤erence condition by ½ 12 (G 1;2 ) then manipulating the two expressions reveals
substituting this back into the indi¤erence condition and solving provides
substituting in for the terms
as reported in the text.
Subgame G 2;3 :
From the text we have the equations for the values of the game
and the indi¤erence conditions
multiplying the indi¤erence conditions by ½ 3 (G 2;3 ) and ½ 2 (G 2;3 )½ 2 (G 2;3 ) respectively yields
substitution the RHS of these expressions into the values of the game gives
simplifying these reduce to
using this information the indi¤erence conditions may be rewritten
rewriting these in terms of ½ 2 (G 2;3 ) and ½ 3 (G 2;3 ) gives
,and
, and
which are the solutions reported in the text.
Subgame G 1;3 :
The solutions for this subgame are derived exactly as in the previous case except …rms 2 and 1 change roles, we immediately have
Appendix 3 -Derivation of the Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Entry
Probabilities for the Game G 1;2;3 .
Exploiting symmetry so ½ 12 (G 1;2;3 )´½ 1 (G 1;2;3 ) = ½ 2 (G 1;2;3 ) 6 = ½ 3 (G 1;2;3 ); we adopt the same method as used in appendix 2 to obtain solution equations for ½ 12 (G 1;2;3 ) and ½ 3 (G 1;2;3 ) of the
We Derive …rst the expression for ½ 12 (G 1;2;3 ) and thus need to obtain expressions for
It now follows that we need to obtain V 3 (F DD j G 1;2 ) and V 3 (DF D j G 2;3 ) from the appropriate subgames
The subgame V 3 (F DD j G 1;2 ) the value to player 3 of this subgame may be written
exploiting symmetry and
from appendix 2 we have
We may now conclude that So we need to solve for the values of subgames V 1 (F DD j G 2;3 ), V 1 (DF D j G 1;3 ), and V 1 (DDF j G 1; 2 )
The subgame G 2;3 From prior calculations we have 2 ¡ ½ 12 (G 1;2 ) ¶ V 1 (F F F j G 1;2 )
his supplies all the terms necessary to compute and simulate ½ 3 (G 1;2;3 ):
